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Abstract 
 
The joint stock company, centred on Oldham, is a central narrative in Douglas 
Farnie’s seminal book, the English Cotton Industry and the World Market. Farnie was 
the first to highlight the idiosyncratic nature of these limited companies, including 
their highly democratic system of governance. Documenting the collapse of this 
system is a useful post-script to Farnie’s analysis. The chapter will extend Farnie’s 
contribution by examining new evidence in the pre-1896 period. It will then go on to 
document subsequent developments after 1896 and show that changes in governance 
had serious consequences for the industry. Cliques of mill owners, and the speculative 
stock market capitalism they engendered, promoted over-expansion of the industry 
and financial instability. The over-expansion of the 1907 boom was repeated with 
disastrous consequences in the re-capitalisation boom of 1919. It will be shown that 
the activities of networks local directors, which had been established pre 1914, not 
financial syndicates, banks, trade unions or government, were responsible for the 
collapse that precipitated the industry’s long decline. 
 
 
Introduction 
The decline of the cotton textile industry has continued until the present day and has 
been a dominant theme in its historiography. Following the collapse in demand for 
Lancashire’s output in the difficult world trading conditions of the 1920s, the debate 
focused on attribution of blame for inaction on various groups.  Keynes accused the 
banks of abandoning their responsibilities, referring to the bankers as 'a species of 
deaf mutes' and Bamberg adds that the competitive structure of bank lending to have 
been inimical to industry recovery.1 Obstinate directors, with ‘individualistic 
attitudes’2 have also been criticised as have the unions for lack of co-operation.3 
Subsequently, obsession with manufacturing decline in the 1970s and 1980s has 
                                                          
1 Keynes J.M. (1981) The Return to Gold and Industrial Policy II, Collected works, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.601. Bamberg, J.H. (1988) `The 
rationalisation of the British cotton industry in the inter-war years', Textile History, 19: 
83-102.  
 
2 Saxonhouse G. and Wright, G. (1987) ‘Stubborn mules and vertical integration: the 
disappearing constraint’, Economic History Review, 40: 87-94. 
 
3 Lazonick, W. (1986) 'The cotton industry', in B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick, The 
Decline of the British Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 18-50. Keynes, 
The Return to Gold, pp.  578-637; Skidelsky, 1992: 261-3). 
 1
coloured interpretations of pre 1914 Lancashire, and left its recent historiography 
dominated by the views of economists, and associated issues of efficiency and rational 
choice. For example it has been argued that the decline of the industry was entirely 
inevitable, and that attempts to preserve it represented a serious mis-allocation of 
resources.4 Others have criticised the industry’s leaders for their alleged conservatism, 
and the rationality of the choices made.5  Lancashire’s decline has also been analysed in 
the context of wider debates regarding the British economy; entrepreneurial failure, 
which has been developed and criticised from a broader sociological perspective;6 and 
industry structure, particularly the impact of vertical specialisation.7  
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
4 Singleton, J. (1991), Lancashire on the scrapheap the cotton industry, 1945-70, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.232. 
 
5  Aldcroft, D.H. (1964), `The Entrepreneur and the British Economy' Economic 
History Review, 2nd Ser. Vol. 17, August, 113-34; Landes, D. (1969), The Unbound 
Prometheus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1969). McCloskey, D. and 
Sandberg, L. (1972), `From Damnation to Redemption: judgements on the late 
Victorian entrepreneur'. Explorations in Economic History, Winter 1971-2, Vol. 9 No. 
2: 89-108. Sandberg, L. (1974), Lancashire in Decline (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press).  
 
6Aldcroft, `The entrepreneur and the British economy' pp. 113-34; Weiner, M. (1981), 
English Culture and the decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980, London, Penguin, 
and the contrasting analysis in Rubinstein, W. (1993), Capitalism, Culture, and 
Decline: 1750-1990, London: Routledge.  
 
7 For the main interpretations see: Sandberg, Lancashire in decline; Lazonick, W. 
(1981), `Competition, Specialization and Industrial Decline', Journal of Economic 
History', Vol. XLI, No.1, pp. 31-8. Lazonick, W. (1981), `Factor Costs and the 
Diffusion of Ring Spinning Prior to World War One', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol.XCVI, No.1, pp. 89-109. Lazonick, W. (1983), `Industrial Organization and 
Technological Change: The Decline of the British Cotton Industry', Business History 
Review, Vol. LVII, Summer pp. 195-236. Saxonhouse, G. and Wright, G. (1987), 
`Stubborn Mules and Vertical Integration: the disappearing constraint', Economic 
History Review, 2nd Ser. Vol. XL(i), pp. 87-94. Mass, W. and Lazonick, W. (1990), 
`The British Cotton Industry and International Competitive Advantage: the state of the 
debates,' Business History, XXXII (4), pp. 9-65. 
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The town of Oldham, however, has not been a prominent feature in these 
stories. Indeed it has been subsumed within the larger story of cotton, the take-off 
industry of the industrial revolution and the dominant export sector of the British 
economy for a century thereafter. Yet, if the structure and ownership of this great 
industry are analysed in detail, it proves to be Oldham, with first its progressive brand 
of democratic and stock-market based capitalism, and later its domination by cliques 
of secretive directors, which perhaps goes furthest to explain its dramatic rise and fall.  
 An exception to the general neglect of Oldham is the work of Douglas Farnie, 
and in particular his benchmark monograph, The English Cotton Industry and the 
World Market, 1815-1896.8 As Farnie explains, the Oldham “limiteds” constituted the 
most important group of joint-stock manufacturing corporations in Britain and were 
responsible for 12 percent of the world’s cotton spinning capacity in 1890 (emphasis 
added).9 In the chapter on the rise of the Oldham Limiteds, Farnie describes a unique 
phenomenon in economic history: a system of capitalism founded on principles of 
democracy, where share-ownership conferred the rights and obligations of 
participation in the management of companies by the shareholders themselves, many 
of whom were mill-operatives.10 Although the ‘Oldham system’ enjoyed a relatively 
short period of supremacy from its inception in around 1860, its major features were 
still intact at the end of the period covered by Farnie in 1896. Thereafter was a 
                                                          
8 Farnie, D. (1979), The English Cotton Industry and the World Market, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
 
 9 Farnie, D. (1982). ‘The emergence of Victorian Oldham as the centre of the cotton 
spinning industry,' Saddleworth Historical Society Bulletin, 12: 41-53, p.42. The 
`Oldham District' comprised a large area of South East Lancashire (much of present day 
Greater Manchester) and included Rochdale to the north, Ashton to the south and 
Middleton to the west. 
 
10 Farnie, English Cotton chapter 7, ‘The emergence of the Oldham Limiteds, 1874-
1890’. 
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dramatic collapse, with the consequence that in almost Aristotlean fashion the virtues 
of the system turned into their opposites, from democratic ownership to factional 
block voting, from open participation and transparency to closed meetings and 
secrecy, from employee participation to collective bargaining, and from prosperity to 
collapse and prolonged decline.  
The association between changes in ownership structure and fluctuation in 
economic performance offers a new perspective on the cause of the collapse of the 
industry and is intended as the first of two contributions in this chapter. It is inspired 
and subsumed by the second purpose, which is to extend Farnie’s seminal work 
beyond 1896. The chapter begins with a re-examination of the democratic phase of 
development. A subsequent section shows how democracy was replaced quite 
suddenly by oligarchy in the slump of the 1890s. The new flotations of the oligarchs 
in 1907 and then 1919 are then examined. Both flotation booms had the same 
characteristics and both might have had the same consequences. In comparing the two 
it is shown that the success of the 1907 boom led to the disaster of the 1919 boom. 
Subsequently, as explained in the final section, the captains of the industry who led 
the final advance in 1907 were incapable of managing the subsequent retreat. 
 
The rise of democratic capitalism 
‘Private enterprise decays and dies, but companies may live forever’.11 The citation 
that begins Farnie’s chapter is from William Marcroft, the founder Sun Mill, 
Oldham’s first co-operative factory and high priest of industrial co-operation. The 
self-help based system of co-operative production advocated by William Marcroft, 
Samuel Smiles and others became a solution to the radicals’ conflict between personal 
                                                          
11 Cited in Farnie, English Cotton, p.244. 
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and collective improvement, and between imitating the middle class and conspiring 
towards its defeat.12 Close proximity to Rochdale, the site of the earliest experiments 
in retail co-operation, and social conditions in Oldham created a receptive climate for 
co-operative ideas. Some small employers who were also labour leaders adopted 
‘Owenite socialism’ in the 1830s reflecting pressures from customers of their 
wholesale businesses and increasing working class agitation.13 A ‘labour aristocracy’ 
of self-acting mule minders inspired by John Bright’s ‘Rochdale Man’ vision of co-
operation, contributed to a less confrontational climate of industrial relations.14 Karl 
Marx, addressing the International Working Men's Association in 1864 recommended 
‘…the working men to embark in co-operative production rather than in co-operative 
stores. The latter touch but the surface of the present economical system, the former 
attacks its groundwork’.15  
 Indeed the practical management of the cotton spinning companies of Oldham 
strongly reflected the democratic ideals of the enlightenment’s radical wing. As late 
as 1892, co-operative societies, whether retail or industrial, were still based on the 
‘Rochdale plan’ of the original pioneers of the 1840s. Each member had one vote at 
the quarterly meeting, without reference to the total number of shares held and was 
barred proxy representation. The earliest industrial co-operative was the Rochdale Co-
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
12 Hobsbawm, E. (1975) The Age of Capital, 1848-1875, London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, p.264. 
 
13 Foster, J. (1974), Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial 
Capitalism in Three English towns, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Jones, B 
(1894), Co-operative Production, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
14 Joyce, P. (1991), Work, Society and Politics: The Culture of the Factory in later 
Victorian England, Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, pp.57-8 
 
15 Marx, K. ‘Inaugural address’, International Working Men's Association, 1864, 
paragraph 5(c) 
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operative Manufacturing Society established in 1854, later known as the Mitchell Hey 
Spinning Company Ltd. All the promoters were members of the Society, all employees 
were shareholders and surpluses were paid as a bonus to labour.16 The company was 
quoted on the Oldham share market from the inception of the share list in 1875 
through to 1914.17 Links between the towns ensured that Marcroft’s Sun Mill, 
Oldham’s first co-operative mill, followed soon after. Having obtained the initial 
capital for the mill by 1862, shareholders were then offered employment at the 
company. As the original smaller operation expanded, during 1866, new capital was 
called at a rate of 3d per week on the £1 shares. A profit sharing scheme for 
operatives was introduced in 1869, although this was abolished in 1875. Similar 
schemes were operated elsewhere in the newer companies during the 1860s and early 
1870s before being superseded by the shareholders’ dividend. Sun Mill’s financial 
success, as measured by the dividends distributed to its operatives, inspired similar 
projects in other districts of South- East Lancashire.18
These financial rewards reflected the serious approach of mill operatives to 
their responsibilities as investors and shareholders. Vociferous and active 
shareholders dominated company meetings, and their expertise often prevailed over 
the views of expendable and poorly rewarded boards of directors.19 Farnie notes, 
‘Such shareholders proved to be the strictest of economists and were prepared to oust 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
16 Rochdale Observer, 10th May, 1890. 
17 Jones, Co-operative Production, pp.2-3. 
 
18 For details of Sun Mill’s profits, see Farnie, English Cotton, p.248. Jones, Co-
operative Production 1894, pp.282-90 
 
19 Directorships were frequently and often hotly contested. A contest at a meeting at the 
Higginshaw Spinning Company was likened to `a miniature Waterloo' (Oldham 
Chronicle, 30th December, 1893, p. 8(vii)). 
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a whole board which failed to produce an acceptable balance sheet, displaying as 
much ruthlessness as the Athenian Ecclesia or the leaders of the French Revolution 
towards their unsuccessful generals.’20 Such ruthlessness was well-justified, and 
Ellison, quoting a contemporary report, explains precisely why: 
 
The daily discussions which take place amongst the shareholders as to why dividends 
are small or otherwise, have led almost every intelligent operative to become more 
economical with materials, more industrious and to see what effect his individual 
efforts have on the cost of the materials produced.  In fact, the bulk of the working 
class operatives of Oldham have more knowledge of the buying of cotton, working it 
up, and selling the manufactured good than most private employers had ten years 
ago...The competition between the managers of one company and those of another, 
and also between the directors of different companies and the pride which each body 
of shareholders take in their own mill is leading to improvements.... so that it is 
almost impossible for the management of any mill owned by working men to be 
seriously defective for any length of time.” (Emphasis added).21
 
Operatives’ knowledge of the cotton economy and the workings of the mills helped 
form expectations about likely profits. Raw material prices were published in the local 
press and mill expenses were standard and well known. Hence operatives and other 
shareholders, assisted by press commentators formed expectations about the earning 
power of their investments. Almost all press share market reports and many company 
reports discussed expected results in comparison to the actual published figures.22
A strike in 1875, and the flotation boom that preceded it during 1873-5, altered the 
course of the history of these hitherto democratic limited companies. Feelings ran 
high during this labour dispute and ‘as the limited companies, which had been 
                                                          
20 Farnie, English cotton, p.266. 
 
21 Ellison, T., (1886) The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, London: Frank Cass, 
Reprinted, 1968, p.138. 
 
22 Oldham Standard, and Oldham Chronicle, all Saturday issues, c.1875-1900; for a 
specific example see the report on the Stock Lane Spinning company, Oldham 
Chronicle, 25th December, 1897 
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accepted as embodying the co-operative principle, were mostly ranged on the side of 
the capitalists…the operatives determined to cripple these companies by withdrawing 
loan capital as far as possible…’23 Even so, many still regarded the limiteds as an 
extension of working class control. At the inauguration of Industry Mill in 1875, the 
engine was christened the "Oldham", as a tribute to the 3.375 million spindles ‘now 
controlled by the working class of Oldham’.24 Meanwhile operatives and increasingly 
middle-class investors were taking shareholdings in several mills. Around 70 new 
companies were floated on the nascent stock market in the 1873-5 boom,25 and it 
became common for operatives to own shares in mills other than their own workplace. 
By 1875 it is clear that a hybrid system had emerged, with co-operative principle of 
democratic voting on the one hand and a stock market system for buying and selling 
shares and collecting dividends on the other, so that Oldham earned the nickname, 
‘Diviborough’.26 Some evidence of the mix of share-ownership in example companies 
is shown in table 2, which contrasts pre-1890 typically co-operative flotations and 
those that were formed later under the auspices of promotional cliques such as those 
                                                          
23 Taylor, J.C. (1900) The Jubilee History of the Oldham Industrial Co-operative 
Society Limited, Manchester: CWS, p.122. 
 
24 Textile Manufacturer, June, 1877, p. 180 
 
25 Yonekawa (1987) Flotation Booms in the Cotton Spinning Industry, 1987-1890: A 
Comparative Study, Business History Review, 551-81, p. p.552. Ownership was 
diverse and, in the town of Oldham itself, may have been as large as a quarter of the 
adult population (Farnie, English Cotton, p.261). 
 
26 Farnie, English Cotton, p. 263. The term stock ‘market’ rather than stock 
‘exchange’ is used deliberately. Despite attempts to establish an official exchange, 
promoters of the idea failed to secure permanent premises and succumbed to the 
tradition of ad hoc trading in local hotels. Thomas, W. (1973), The Provincial Stock 
Exchanges. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, pp. 149-150. A possible reason was that 
it facilitated the trading of shares in outlying towns and industrial villages. For 
example the Oldham practices were copied by the ‘Stalybridge Share Market’, which 
carried on in a private house in Stalybridge (Oldham Standard, 13th December, 1884). 
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led by John Bunting.27  
                                                          
27 Farnie, D. (1984-6), ‘John Bunting’, in Jeremy, D. (ed), Dictionary of Business 
Biography, London: Butterworths, pp.506-9, p.507. 
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Table 1: Trends in Company share Ownership, 1874-1907 
 
Panel a) All Companies 1874-6 1884-90 1894-7 1898-1907
Average number per company:  
Shareholders  384.60 338.33 255.90 195.25
Shareholder/operatives (1) 78.40 42.00 26.20 14.25
Share transactions per year 78.20 71.17 10.00 31.88
Average number of shares per shareholder 27.91 37.71 73.79 157.62
Percentage of total shares per company held by:  
Operatives 22.22 11.91 9.99 5.15
Block holders (>3%) 19.41 20.27 30.62 42.25
 
Panel b) Companies floated before 1890 (2)  
Average number per company:  
Shareholders  331.67 297.00
Shareholder/operatives 32.17 21.25
Share transactions per year 11.33 54.00
Average number of shares per shareholder 37.92 48.21
Percentage of total shares per company held by:  
Operatives 9.10 5.89
Block holders (>3%) 20.81 19.40
 
Panel c) Companies floated after 1890  
Average number per company:  
Shareholders  152.80 59.67
Shareholder/operatives 18.40 2.00
Shares controlled by block shareholders (>3%) 6069.60 12513.00
share transactions per year 10.60 6.00
Average number of shares per shareholder 112.32 338.95
Percentage of total shares per company held by:  
Operatives 11.41 1.94
Block holders (>3%) 43.05 75.48
 
Source: Adapted from the analysis of Annual Returns (Form E) in the Public Record 
Office (PRO) in J.S. Toms (2002), ‘The Rise of Modern Accounting and the Fall of 
the Public Company: the Lancashire Cotton Mills, 1870-1914’, Accounting 
Organizations and Society, Vol.27, No. 1/2, p.  
Notes:  
(1) Operative shareholders are defined as shareholders whose main occupation was 
described on the share list as related to textile factory work. 
(2) Belgian, Henshaw Street, Livingstone, Shiloh, Thornham, and Dowry. Although 
Dowry was promoted by John Bunting in 1884, as a relatively early flotation it was 
included in panel B of table 2. 
(3) Empire, Summervale and Times, floated by John Bunting post-1890 (Farnie, 
1984-6, p. 507). 
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Table 1 shows the changing ownership patterns for these sub-groups. 
Companies Act legislation of 1844, 1856 and 1862 combined with the co-operative 
origins of the original companies promoted companies with broad share ownership 
among working classes investors. Belgian, Shiloh and Thornham were typical, and 
many shareholders in such companies owned only one partly paid share.28 Athough 
block shareholders were important in the 1870s, they too reflected the co-operative 
principles. Local co-operatives provided significant amounts of loan and equity 
capital. In the boom years of 1874-5, the Oldham Equitable Co-operative Society took 
up 200 shares the Equitable Spinning Company and 100 in the Glodwick and 
Thornham Spinning Companies, whilst placing £3000, £3000 and £1000 respectively 
on deposit with the loan accounts of each company.29 As a conduit for local savings, 
the Oldham stock market became an important institution. Another consequence of 
ownership structure was that some Lancashire companies Articles stated that Table A 
of the Companies Act did not apply and inserted clauses stating that each member 
shall have one vote only.30 Such decisions closely reflected social ownership and 
provide historians and corporate governance regulators alike with a unique example 
of shareholder democracy.31
                                                          
28 Respectively these companies had 639, 295 and 406 shareholders and average 
shareholdings of 22, 17 and 18 (PRO BT31/14469/7869, 14486/8310 and 
14494/8449). See also Yonekawa, ‘Flotation booms’ p.552. 
 
29 Taylor, The Jubilee History, p.75. 
 
30 For example, Article 12 of the Thornham Cotton Spinning Company Articles of 
Association, 1874 (PRO BT31/14494/8449). This contrasts with the one share one 
vote rule adopted in the revised 1899 Articles. 
 
31 Democratic voting systems were compatible with Table A in the 1862 Companies 
Act. The use of graduated voting was quite widespread in the period 1862-1900 in the 
USA. Dunlavy, C. (1998). ‘Corporate governance in late nineteenth century Europe and 
the U.S.: the case of shareholder voting rights’. In Hopt, K., Kanda, H., Roe, M., 
Wymeersch, E. and Prigge, S. (eds.). Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of 
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The crisis of democracy and the rise of the speculator 
Although the benefits of one-shareholder one vote may seem desirable in the wake of 
Enron and other corporate scandals, it is unlikely that modern day regulators will 
follow the Oldham example. Notwithstanding the implied transfer of power away 
from finance capital, even socially embedded democratic systems need continued 
regulation, lest they contain the seeds of their own demise. In the Oldham case the 
fault lines of the democratic governance system were embedded in the inequality of 
wealth distribution in late Victorian England and fractured by the vicissitudes of the 
economic cycle. 
  The downturn of 1890-1 turned into a steep and unprecedented slump lasting 
until 1896 and this proved the decisive event for the transformation of democratic 
control into corporate oligarchy. "The darkest hour precedes the dawn", wrote an 
Oldham Standard correspondent hopefully in 1892, imagining perhaps that the 
recession would be of usual length and could not possibly continue much longer.32 
Lancashire’s fortunes depended on export demand, but when combined with the 
speculative positions many firms had taken on the Liverpool market an acute scissors 
effect wiped out profit margins.33 For local investors the consequence was a stock 
market crash of unprecedented length and severity (see figure 1). By 1896, most 
companies had adverse balances on their reserve accounts. In some cases these 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the Art and Emerging Research. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.29-32. However, there 
are no other examples of the ‘one shareholder one vote’ rule, co-operative principles 
of member participation and stock market quotation coinciding for such a large 
number of manufacturing companies. 
  
32 Oldham Standard, 20th February 1892. 
 
33 The lowest prices since 1848 were recorded in Liverpool in March 1892 (Oldham 
Standard, 12th March 1892). Falling prices and their misjudgement damaged the profits 
of companies those companies that bought speculatively and were left holding 
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balances amounted to several years’ worth of average profits, so that there could have 
been no expectation of a dividend amongst the shareholders.34 Financial adversity 
made operative shareholders less reliant on the ‘divi’ and reliant instead on effective 
craft-based trade union organisation.35 Increasingly tempestuous industrial relations 
culminated in the ‘Brooklands Lockout’, the subsequent agreement of 1893 and the 
institutionalization of bargaining thereafter. An important feature of the new system 
was its promotion of employer and operative collaboration to further collective 
interests, for example through political lobbying.36 The dispute and the agreement were 
predicated on the vulnerability of the industry to the business cycle.37 The longest bear 
market they had known finally ended in March 1896, and as new gold discoveries in 
Alaska and South Africa restored competitiveness in silver using export markets, 
there followed a general return to prosperity in the years before 1914.  
In the meantime the Oldham co-operative investors had fallen victim to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
significant stocks of ‘dear cotton’ (Oldham Standard, 7th February, 14th February, 28th 
February, 23rd May 1891). 
 
34 The poor condition of many companies was revealed by a survey in the Oldham 
Standard, 29th December 1894. The Belgian, Gladstone, Hope and Werneth Cotton 
Spinning Companies had adverse balances greater than £20,000 (the average 
subscribed equity capital per company in 1885 was £38,200 (calculated from the 
appendix data in Smith, R. (1961), ‘An Oldham Limited Liability Company, 1875-
1896’, Business History, December, Vol, 4 (2), pp. 34-53,  pp.52-3).  
 
35 For a detailed explanation of the epistemological and technical basis of trade union 
power, see Fowler 
 
 36 For example, a joint committee was established to consider `the opening of new 
markets abroad, the alteration of restrictive tariffs, and other similar matters which may 
benefit of injure the cotton trade..', Brooklands Agreement, 1893, Board of Trade Report 
on Wages and Hours of Labour, Part II, Standard Piece Rates, C.7567, Vol. XXXI, pp. 
9-11. 
37 Employers were allowed to move for up to a five per cent reduction in wages; 
conversely up to a five per cent increase could be requested by employees, as determined 
by the economic cycle; K. Burgess (1975), The Origins of British Industrial Relations, 
(London, Croom Helm, p. 233. 
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operators in the Liverpool market and more importantly for the longer run, to the 
activities of mill building syndicates within their own locality. Thus in the regular 
boom/recession cycle of the period 1870-1890, there were mill promotion booms in 
1873-5, 1883-4 and 1889-90. These mill-building booms were punctuated by 
temporary periods of recession. Each flotation boom created significant profit making 
opportunities for cliques of mill promoters.38 During the boom of 1888, the Oldham 
Standard published a vitriolic attack on the activities of fraudulent company 
promoters, describing them as ‘thieves of a most destructive class’.39 Whether 
fraudulent or not, ‘hateful' and ‘reckless’ mill building was condemned both by 
private spinners and those committed to the existing co-operative factories. The 
resulting tendency to allow supply to outstrip demand posed a threat to the profits of 
established concerns.40 Prior to the slump of the 1890s, promoters had attracted 
criticism for undermining the old limited liability system. Now, as share prices 
reached unprecedented low values, they had the opportunity to usurp it entirely. 
A report in the Oldham Standard in 1898 noted the transition. ‘It is said that 
they (promoters) are large holders of shares, many of which have been purchased 
within a comparatively recent period at very reasonable rates. One must hope that 
self-interest is not the guiding principle in their eagerness to get rid of the adverse 
balance, secure a dividend, and improve the selling price of the shares’.41 The effects 
of systematic wealth transfers in favour of these cliques are indicated by the growth in 
block shareholders (table 2). They included private spinners, for example Ralph 
                                                          
38 Farnie, English Cotton, pp. 250-1. 
 
39 Oldham Standard, 16th June, 1888. 
 
40 Oldham Standard, 27th April 1889. 
 
41 Oldham Standard, 24th September, 1898 
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Bagley, and Manchester-based tradesmen, such as William Kenyon. Their appearance 
on the share registers of John Bunting’s new companies (Summervale, Empire and 
Times) also illustrates how promoters mobilised savings of known contacts. A further 
aspect of the changed structure of share ownership was the tendency for mill 
managers to purchase block shareholdings in their own companies and hence secure 
directorships and financial gain. Thomas Gartside (1857-1941), mill manager of Shiloh 
Spinning Company, acquired a large block of shares in the company during the period 
1897-1905. Meanwhile, 'gangs of promoters' floated new mills. These comprised ‘two 
or three mill managers who hankered after a directorship, a landowner with land to 
sell, a lawyer, architect, engineer and contractor in search of employment, and a yarn 
agent and cotton broker in quest of commission on the sale of yarn or cloth’.42 One 
firm of accountants promoted 12 mills in the period 1899-1914.43 Samuel Odgen 
Ward personified the transitional phase of Oldham capitalism. As an Alderman and 
JP, he was committed to the co-operative movement. Yet during the 1880s and 1890s 
he amassed directorships on the boards of several companies,44 thereby breaking one 
of the movement’s main rules, that committee members should hold no more than one 
office. Other examples in Oldham included Thomas Henthorn (1850-1913), Harry 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
42 Report of the Tariff Commission, 1905, cited in Jones, Jones, F. (1959) The Cotton 
Spinning Industry in the Oldham District from 1896 to 1914, MA thesis, University of 
Manchester, p.13. 
 
43 Jones, The Cotton Spinning Industry, p.13. 
 
44 From reports of company meetings (Oldham Standard, various issues, 1888/9), 
Ward served on the boards of Werneth, Coldhurst, Henshaw Street, Northmoor and 
Broadway Spinning Companies. Taylor, The Jubilee History  pp.112 & 125. 
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Dixon (1880-1947), William Hopwood (1862-1936), Ralph Morton (1875-1942), John 
S. Hammersley (1863-1933), and Sam Firth Mellor (1873-1938).45
In many companies during 1897 and 1898, these director-owners consolidated 
their control via the mechanism of extraordinary general meetings. Here they put 
forward and secured approval for the adoption of new articles of association. These 
allowed for the plutocratic one share one vote system, voting by proxy, minimum 
shareholding qualifications for directors and the removal of the obligation to forward 
accounts to shareholders.46 Powerful new cliques usurped the voice prerogative to 
control company meetings and appoint directors, whilst disenfranchised minorities were 
left holding unsaleable shares. Economic and social change thereby underpinned 
voluntary changes in governance structures. There was a tendency for companies to 
move from quarterly to half yearly meetings and an increased reluctance to disclose 
financial information to the press, for example the resolution passed at the Glodwick 
Spinning Company in 1897.47 As the new oligarchs consolidated their control, 
economic conditions gave them new opportunities to profit from mill flotations. 
 
The boom of 1907 
A characteristic of the slump of the 1890s was the loss of the silver-using Indian 
market due to the relatively high price of gold. As gold prices fell, Lancashire and in 
particular the coarse sector around Oldham began to recover the Indian market. 
Although punctuated by minor recessions, until 1914, Lancashire entrepreneurs were 
                                                          
45 Gurr, D. and Hunt, J. (1989), The Cotton Mills of Oldham, Oldham: Oldham 
Leisure Services, pp. 9-10. 
 
46 For examples, inter alia, see Oldham Standard, 27th November, 1897, 1st October, 
8th October, 5th November 1898 
 
47 Farnie, ‘John Bunting’ p.508; Oldham Standard, 27th November, 1897. 
 16
faced with consistent increases in demand and profits (Figure 2).48 Accounting profit 
rates grew steadily from 1896 onwards and peaked in the boom of 1907.49 In turn, 
this prompted an unprecedented mill building boom in the period 1904-8, centred on 
the Oldham district.50 Special features of the boom of 1907 were that promoters 
attracted outside investors using large amounts of loan finance and a large proportion 
of the profit was distributed as repayments and bonus dividends.51 Bunting floated the 
largest mill to date, the Times No. 2 in 1907 at 100,000 spindles (Oldham Chronicle, 
28th December, 1907).  
By the 1900s, `empires’ of individually controlled mills but otherwise un-
integrated businesses, became more clearly established.52 Profits from existing mills 
were channelled via the estates of these proprietary capitalists into personally 
administered flotations or acquisitions of other concerns.53 The proprietors of these 
                                                          
 
48  Figure two refers to the coarse spinning section only.  
 
49 Toms, S. (1998) ‘Growth, Profits and Technological Choice: The Case of the 
Lancashire Cotton Textile Industry’, Journal of Industrial History, Vol. 1(1); pp.35-
55. 
 
50 During the period 1897-1913 installed spindleage increased by 2 per cent per 
annum in Lancashire but by 2.7 per cent in Oldham (calculated from Robson, R. 
(1957), The Cotton Industry in Britain, London: Macmillan. tables 2 and 5, pp. 334 and 
340 and Farnie, English Cotton, p.42. The higher rate in Oldham was a function of the 
extraordinary boom of the middle years of the 1900s.  For details of the mills 
constructed, see Jones, The Cotton Spinning Industry, pp. 221-3. 
 
51 Toms, S. (1998), ‘Windows of opportunity in the textile industry: the business 
strategies of Lancashire entrepreneurs 1880-1914’. Business History, 40(1): 1-25. 
 
52 Toms S. (1998), `The Supply of and Demand for Accounting Information in an 
Unregulated Market: Examples from the Lancashire Cotton Mills', Accounting 
Organizations and Society Vol. 23, No. 2; pp.217-238. 
. 
53 Toms, S. (1994), `Financial Constraints on Economic Growth: Profits, Capital 
Accumulation, and the Development of the Lancashire Cotton Spinning Industry, 
1885-1914,' Accounting Business and Financial History, Vol. 4 (3), pp. 364-383.  
Toms, S. (1996), `The Finance and Growth of the Lancashire Textile Industry, 1870-
1914', Ph.D thesis, University of Nottingham, March. Toms ‘Windows of 
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groups of mills possessed access to financial resources based on reputation and 
personal contact.54 Strategy formulation became the exclusive preserve of these 
individuals whilst managers became nominee officials at plant level, trusted only with 
routine, thereby precluding the emergence of professional managerial hierarchies.55 
These changes created a highly unusual system of governance based on diversified 
directors and non-diversified shareholders (in the conventional model of Anglo Saxon 
economies it is the other way round). As a consequence capital ownership centralised 
and the industry increasingly fell under the control of speculative entrepreneurs.56   
A further consequence was that speculative mill building in 1907 by these 
'gangs of promoters' destroyed the profit margins of installed capacity and left the 
industry over-committed in subsequent slumps in demand.57 According to a 
contemporary estimate in 1935, there were 13.5 million surplus spindles of which 9.5 
were in the American section and 4 million in the Egyptian section, representing. 
plant utilisation of just 69%.58 As early as the 1880s the industry already contained 
over 40 million spindles.59 Put simply, the capacity installed by promoters in the 
boom period of 1896-1914 was all potentially surplus in the light of industry 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Opportunity’. 
 
54 Tyson, R. E. (1962), ‘Sun Mill: A Study in Democratic Investment', Unpublished 
M.A. Thesis, University of Manchester, Thomas, W., The Provincial Stock 
Exchanges, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd (1973).962; Toms, ‘The Supply of’. 
 
55  Toms, ‘Windows of Opportunity’ pp. 1-25; Toms, The Finance and Growth, pp. 
217-238;  
56   Toms, The Finance and Growth, pp.226-31. 
 
57  Jones, The Cotton Spinning Industry, p.3. 
 
58 Barlow, T.D. (1935), “Surplus capacity in the Lancashire Cotton Industry.” 
Manchester School, 6, pp.32-36: p.35; Robson, The Cotton Industry, Table 8, p.344.  
 
59  Calculated from Robson, The Cotton Industry, Table 5, p.340.  
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requirements after 1920. Over-capacity was compounded because corporate growth 
rates were strongest where private or family control was exercised and weakest where 
there was dependency on regional stock markets.60 Yet it was in stock market 
dominated Oldham, where there was the greatest expansion of capacity. 
A final important consequence of oligarchic control was for the technological 
development of the industry. Because the commercial and technical advantages of 
ring spinning and the automatic loom were not yet established,61 entrepreneurs 
ploughed the resources from the pre 1914 booms into specialised establishments using 
traditional technologies. It is for this reason that whilst there were few advocates of 
integrated production before 1914, technical issues associated with disintegration 
came to the fore in the 1920s and 1930s. The critique of specialisation from within the 
industry came from disenfranchised technical experts rather than business leaders.62 
The governance structure inherited from the nineteenth century meant the opinions of 
                                                          
 
60  Toms, ‘Windows of opportunity,’ p.3. 
 
61  See, for example, Saxonhouse, G. and Wright, G. (1984), `New Evidence on the 
Stubborn English Mule and the Cotton Industry, 1878-1920,' Economic History 
Review, Second Series, vol. XXXVII, No.4, pp. 507-19, p.519. A more recent 
discussion of the commercial and technological factors which affected the adoption of 
ring spinning during the inter-war years is contained in D.M. Higgins and J.S. Toms 
(1997), `Firm Structure and Financial Performance: the Lancashire textile Industry, 
c.1884-1960', Accounting Business and Financial History, Vol. 7, No.2; pp.195-232, 
pp.212-214. 
 
62 Developments in intermediate processing, principally high drafting, doffing and 
winding that were developed and available commercially after 1914 gave a decisive 
advantage to the ring and automatic loom combination by the 1930s. J.S. Toms (1998), 
`Growth, Profits and Technological Choice: The Case of the Lancashire Cotton Textile 
Industry', Journal of Industrial History, Vol.1 (1), pp.35-55. For examples of technicians’ 
criticisms of industry structure, see Lazonick, ‘Industrial Organization and 
Technological Change’, and Robinson, ‘Business Methods’; Holt, ‘High Speed 
Winding,’ as cited in Lazonick, pp. 104-5. 
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mill managers were much constrained by the actions of the directors. Pre-1914, the 
industry ownership and its consequences dominated the issue of technical choice. 
 
The boom of 1919 
Following the gap left by the First World War, there was a further flotation boom in 
1919. The overwhelming and immediate cause of the Lancashire crisis post-1922, was 
the collapse in demand in export markets. As Figure 1 shows the boom of 1919-20 
was dramatic even by the standards of this heavily cyclical industry. Unlike the 1907 
boom that led to expansion of capacity through mill building, the 1919 boom was 
driven by wider margins associated with shortages and temporary dis-equilibrium in 
world markets. There was no physical increase in demand for Lancashire textiles. 
Also, a new wave of mill construction was prevented by a shortage of equipment and 
building supplies. Consequently, money capital was invested by financial syndicates 
through the re-capitalisation of existing mills with bonus issues and new loan 
finance.63 These aspects of the boom determined the subsequent financial 
characteristics of many Lancashire firms.  
A crucial and previously unanswered question is who were the members of the 
financial syndicates? There were striking continuities between the investor groups in 
the Oldham section in the 1919-20 boom and the operations of similar groups, 
sometimes involving the same individuals, in the pre 1914 period. The syndicates 
investing in Oldham in 1919 -20 were organised by the pre-war investor groups using 
the networks they had built up before 1914. Therefore important features of the 
                                                          
63 Daniels, G. and Jewkes, J. (1928), ‘The post war depression in the Lancashire 
cotton industry’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 91, pp. 153-206, p.170; 
Thomas, W. (1973), The Provincial Stock Exchanges, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 
p.156. 
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booms of 1907 and 1919 were the activities of John Bunting, Firth Mellor, 
Hammersley and others. As a result by 1919, promoter and share dealer Sam Firth 
Mellor was a director of 18 companies, and Bunting, of the same occupation held 
14.64 Another important continuity was the involvement of successor generations. So 
James Henry Bunting continued his pre-war apprenticeship whilst successive 
generations of the architects and mill-designers A.H. Stott and Sons continued their 
practice of investing in the mills they helped to build.65 Outside investors were 
attracted using pre-1914 networks, so new calls were made on the likes of 
Manchester-based John Kenyon and William P. Hartley,  (who had made money in 
preserves) to support the flotation of the Textile Spinning Company and the Asia 
Spinning Company. The Buntings, John and James Henry, were co-directors of 
Textile Mill. Just as in 1907, the investors of the 1919-20 re-capitalisation boom were 
local, inter-connected, had intensive knowledge of industry finance and were 
continuing well-established practice from before 1914.  
The oligarchs who had brought about the demise of the democratic system in 
the Oldham district, now engineered the downfall of the whole industry. A statistical 
analysis of the accounts of a large sample of cotton companies taken from the period 
1925-1931, shows that fewer recapitalised firms left the industry compared to non-
                                                          
64 Firth Mellor’s interests were: Argyll, Broadway; Fernhurst, Gee Cross Mill, Gorse, 
Greenacres, Hartford, Marland, Mars, Mersey, Monton, Moor, Orb, Peel Mills Co, 
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Higgins, D., Toms, S. and Filatotchev, I. (2007), ‘Financial syndicates and the collapse 
of the Lancashire cotton industry, 1919-1931’, York Management School Working 
Paper. In total Bunting is known to have been involved in fourteen or so promotions. 
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65  For a biographical discussion of the activities of three generations of the Stott 
family, 1862-1937, see Farnie, D.A. and Gurr, D.A (1998), ‘Design and construction 
of mills’, in Gurr, D.A. and Hunt, J. The Cotton Mills of Oldham, Oldham, Oldham 
Education and Leisure. pp.15-18. 
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recapitalised firms. However, in view of the excess capacity problem, it was 
imperative that some firms exited the industry. Ownership itself, in particular 
oligarchic control, now became an overwhelming exit barrier, preventing the 
reorganisation of the industry.66 They now pursued a rational strategy of forcing the 
managers of their firms to continue undercutting their competitors on marginal 
contracts, because the only alternative was to realise their investments at seriously 
deflated values, losing all the profits of their earlier speculations. In contrast to the 
arguments of Keynes, Bamberg and others, indebtedness to the banks, seems a less 
important cause of weak selling and indeed firms with greater bank debt were more 
likely to leave the industry. Oligarchic companies were typically larger and enjoyed 
stronger market position, and as a result tended to be more successful than their 
competitors in terms of profitability. However, most of the profit was paid out as 
dividend, allowing some recovery of invested capital, but starving the industry of cash 
for re-equipment.  
The failure to re-equip had not been material in the pre-1914 expansion. 
Indeed, the spinning mule and Lancashire loom system were as effective as their 
alternatives until that point. However the 1920s saw major improvements in 
preparatory and intermediate winding processes and in high speed drafting. With 
these developments ring spinning and automatic weaving organised in vertically 
integrated factories. International competition, most notably the US cotton industry, 
was well placed to exploit these advances in production methods. Lancashire by 
contrast, needed to refinance before any such investment could take place, and 
refinancing was prevented by the ownership structure of the industry. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
66 Higgins et al. ‘Financial syndicates’. Filatotchev, I. and Toms, S. (2006), ‘Financial 
constraints on strategic turnarounds’, Journal of Management Studies 
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 Epilogue: Lancashire in the 1950s 
Following the end of the post-war boom in 1952, the Lancashire cotton industry once 
again faced problems of overcapacity and the need for reorganization. However, the 
ownership pattern that had developed before 1914, consolidated in the 1920s, 
continued to ossify along with the industry in the 1950s. Control by interlocking 
directorships was a crucial feature throughout the industry’s decline phase. A survey 
using annual returns of these companies in the 1950s has revealed interlocking 
directorships and a rump of residual small private shareholders.67 Table 2 shows that 
the typical Lancashire director sat on the boards of far more other companies in 
comparison to national averages. The average director of the typical large British 
company in 1950 held just that one board position, whereas the typical Lancashire 
director held three or four board positions with a significant minority holding more 
than six. This governance structure reflected the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
century developments referred to above. Hence the most common type of interlock 
was in other cotton industry companies. The average age of each director in the Table 
1 sample was 59 years, suggesting that whilst many had served during the crisis years 
of the inter-war period, a minority had also participated in the development of earlier 
‘Bunting-style’ groups. At the same time, it is suggestive that centralisation of 
directors' power acted as a barrier to the development of new managerial talent. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
67 Filatotchev, I. and Toms, J.S. (2003), ‘Corporate Governance, Strategy and Survival 
in a Declining Industry: A Study of Lancashire Textile Companies’, Journal of 
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Table 2 
 
The Distribution of Directorships in British Enterprises, 1950 
 
 
     (1)   (2) 
     Cotton Textiles All British Enterprises 
     1950 
     %   % 
 
Number of directorships per person   
 
1     19.2%   87.4% 
2     13.2%   8.5% 
3-5     43.7%   3.9% 
6 or more    23.9%   0.2% 
 
     ------   ------ 
     100.0%  100.0% 
     ------   ------ 
 
 
(1) % of directors in each category from a sample of 167 directors from 45 quoted 
textile companies. 
(2) % of directors in each category from the top 250 British enterprises. The % is 
estimated from Scott (1997), p.117 which provides breakdowns for the years 1938 
and 1976. The figures shown here are a simple average for those two years. 
 
 
 
Sources: Annual Returns (form E) Companies House and PRO files. Scott (1997: 
117). Toms J.S. and I Filatotchev (2004) Corporate Governance, Business Strategy 
and the Dynamics of Networks: A Theoretical Model and Application to the British 
Cotton Industry, 1830-1980, Organization Studies, vol.25, pp.629-651. 
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Meanwhile share-ownership was individual rather than institutional, primarily 
because share quotations were based on thin local stock markets, and this was also the 
case for the larger conglomerates and the larger number of smaller quoted firms.68 
Instead of institutional ownership there was substantial share-ownership by directors, 
their families and members of founding families. Oligarchic block share-ownership 
compounded the problem of thin markets and the general fortunes of this by now 
seriously under-invested and un-modernised industry meant there were few 
enthusiastic buyers of cotton shares.  
 
Conclusion: the English Cotton Industry and the loss of the world market  
The English cotton industry’s loss of its world market can be attributed primarily to 
its ownership by oligarchies of directors and their financial schemes before and after 
the First World War. The beginning of Lancashire’s problems can be dated to 1896, 
which saw the end of democratic capitalism in Oldham and its replacement by the 
speculative oligarchs. Of course, other factors were important. The rise of overseas 
competition and the retreat from empire were the result of powerful forces that 
representatives of the cotton industry, in Oldham or elsewhere, could do little about.  
With a different structure of ownership, however, the crisis of the 1920s need 
not necessarily have happened and cotton textiles might have retained its competitive 
edge for longer in line with other textile sectors. In relation to the problem of 
ownership and associated financial control, the issues raised by economic historians, 
such as failure to restructure and failure to invest in new technology are secondary as 
explanations for the poor performance and decline of the industry.  
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With different ownership, new investment and re-organisation would have 
been possible. So is this merely a restatement of the entrepreneurial failure 
hypothesis? In the past, the entrepreneurial failure hypothesis has been set out in 
terms of failure to act according to the rational requirements of the economic 
situation. Examples might be failure to invest, to develop marketing expertise and so 
on. In the case described above, however, it is clear that the problem was not that 
entrepreneurs failed to act. Indeed they acted decisively to exploit the short run profit 
opportunities that frequently presented themselves in this cyclical industry. They 
acted decisively to overcome constraints that might be imposed on their actions 
through transparent structures of governance and accountability. They decisively 
seized control of the industry from other stakeholders. By 1922, they could not act 
decisively to reorganise the industry, because by that time they were paralysed by the 
consequences of their own actions.   
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